



March 14, 2015

VIA FAX (303-239-3799)

Ruth Welch, State Director
Colorado State Office
BLM
2850 Youngfield St.
Lakewood, CO 80215

Dear Ms. Welch:

The Center for Biological Diversity (the “Center”), Living Rivers, Rocky Mountain Wild, and Sierra Club hereby file this Protest of the Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”)’s planned May 12, 2016 oil and gas lease sale, Determination of NEPA Adequacy (“DNA”) DOI-BLM-CO-S010-2016-0012-DNA, and Environmental Assessment DOI-BLM-CO-N050-2015-0092-EA, pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 3120.1-3. We formally protest the inclusion of each of the following parcels, covering 7,907.41 acres in the Tres Rios Field Office in Archuleta and La Plata Counties, and 813.07 acres in the Little Snake Field Office in Moffat and Routt Counties:

COC77676
COC77677
COC77678
COC77679
COC77680
COC77681

PROTEST

1. Protesting Party: Contact Information and Interests:

This Protest is filed on behalf of the Center for Biological Diversity, Living Rivers, Rocky Mountain Wild, Sierra Club, and Utah Rivers Council, and their boards and members by:

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The Center is a non-profit environmental organization with 47,955 member activists, including members who live and recreate in the Little Snake and Tres Rios planning areas, including the San Juan National Forest. The Center uses science, policy and law to advocate for the conservation and recovery of species on the brink of extinction and the habitats they need to survive. The Center has and continues to actively advocate for increased protections for species and habitats in the planning area on lands managed by the BLM and the Forest Service. The lands that will be affected by the proposed lease sale include habitat for listed, rare, and imperiled species that the Center has worked to protect including the Columbian sharp-tailed grouse, Colorado pikeminnow, razorback sucker, humpback chub, and bonytail. The Center's

board, staff, and members use the lands within the planning area, including the lands and waters that would be affected by actions under the lease sale, for quiet recreation (including hiking and camping), scientific research, aesthetic pursuits, and spiritual renewal.

Living Rivers is a nonprofit organization based in Moab, Utah that promotes river restoration through mobilization. By articulating conservation and alternative management strategies to the public, Living Rivers seeks to revive the natural habitat and spirit of rivers by undoing the extensive damage done by dams, and water-intensive energy development on the Colorado Plateau. Living Rivers has approximately 1,200 members in Utah, Colorado and other states. Living Rivers' members and staff use the public lands in Utah and Colorado, including the lands and waters that would be affected by actions under the lease sale, for quiet recreation (including hiking and camping), scientific research, aesthetic pursuits, and spiritual renewal.

Rocky Mountain Wild is dedicated to conserving and recovering native and naturally functioning ecosystems in the Greater Southern Rockies and Plains. Its members value the clean water, fresh air, healthy communities, sources of food and medicine, and recreational opportunities provided by native ecosystems. RMW passionately believes that all species and their natural communities have the right to exist and thrive. Rocky Mountain Wild uses the best available science to forward its mission through participation in policy, administrative processes, legal action, public outreach and organizing, and education. RMW has a long history of participating in BLM oil and gas leasing decisions and policy through commenting on and protesting leasing actions.

The Sierra Club is a national nonprofit organization of approximately 625,000 members dedicated to exploring, enjoying, and protecting the wild places of the earth; to practicing and promoting the responsible use of the earth's ecosystems and resources; to educating and enlisting humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to using all lawful means to carry out these objectives. The Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Sierra Club has approximately 17,000 members in the state of Colorado. The Sierra Club has members who live and recreate in the Little Snake and Tres Rios planning areas, including the San Juan National Forest. Sierra Club members use the public lands in Colorado, including the lands and waters that would be affected by actions under the lease sale, for quiet recreation, scientific research, aesthetic pursuits, and spiritual renewal. These areas would be threatened by increased oil and gas development that could result from the proposed lease sale.

Utah Rivers Council is a grassroots organization dedicated to the conservation and stewardship of Utah's rivers and sustainable clean water sources for Utah's people and wildlife. Founded in 1995, Utah Rivers Council works to protect Utah's rivers and clean water sources for today's citizens, future generations and healthy, sustainable natural ecosystems. It implements its mission through grassroots organizing, direct advocacy, research, education, community leadership, and litigation. The Utah Rivers Council is critically concerned with the impacts river diversions and climate change bring to Utah's river and wetland ecosystems, including activities in the Upper Colorado River Basin tributaries upstream of Utah.

2. Statement of Reasons as to Why the Proposed Lease Sale Is Unlawful:

BLM's proposed decision to lease the parcels listed above is substantively and procedurally flawed for the reasons discussed below, as well as those discussed in our comment on the Environmental Assessment (EA) for the Little Snake portion of the lease sale, which is attached hereto and incorporated by reference. BLM's failure to address multiple environmental issues in the EA and in its response to comments regarding the lease auction, equally apply to the Tres Rios portion of the lease sale.

I. BLM Must End All New Fossil Fuel Leasing and Hydraulic Fracturing.

The following discussion updates the Center's previous request for no new leasing and fracking in the Little Snake planning area, in light of new information that has arisen since the EA comment period, and applies to the Tres Rios portion of the lease auction as well.

Climate change is a problem of global proportions resulting from the cumulative greenhouse gas emissions of countless individual sources. A comprehensive look at the impacts of fossil fuel extraction, and especially fracking, across all of the planning areas affected by the leases in updated RMPs is absolutely necessary. BLM has *never* thoroughly considered the cumulative climate change impacts of *all* potential fossil fuel extraction and fracking (1) within each of the planning areas, (2) across the state, and (3) across all public lands. Proceeding with new leasing proposals *ad hoc* in the absence of a comprehensive plan that addresses climate change and fracking is premature and risks irreversible damage before the agency and public have had the opportunity to weigh the full costs of oil and gas and other fossil fuel extraction and consider necessary limits on such activities. Therefore BLM must cease all new leasing at least until the issue is adequately analyzed in a programmatic review of all U.S. fossil fuel leasing, or at least within amended RMPs.

A. BLM Must Limit Greenhouse Gas Emissions By Keeping Federal Fossil Fuels In the Ground

Expansion of fossil fuel production will substantially increase the volume of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere and jeopardize the environment and the health and well being of future generations. BLM's mandate to ensure "harmonious and coordinated management of the various resources *without permanent impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality of the environment*" requires BLM to limit the climate change effects of its actions.¹ Keeping all unleased fossil fuels in the ground and banning fracking and other unconventional well stimulation methods would lock away millions of tons of greenhouse gas pollution and limit the destructive effects of these practices.

A ban on new fossil fuel leasing and fracking is necessary to meet the U.S.'s greenhouse gas reduction commitments. On December 12, 2015, 197 nation-state and supra-national organization parties meeting in Paris at the 2015 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of the Parties consented to an agreement (Paris Agreement) committing its parties to take action so as to avoid dangerous climate change.² As the Paris

¹ See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(7), 1702(c), 1712(c)(1), 1732(a) (emphasis added); *see also id.* § 1732(b) (directing Secretary to take any action to "prevent unnecessary or undue degradation" of the public lands).

² Paris Agreement, Art. 2.

Agreement opens for signature in April 2016³ and the United States is expected to sign the treaty⁴ as a legally binding instrument through executive agreement,⁵ the Paris Agreement commits the United States to critical goals—both binding and aspirational—that mandate bold action on the United States’ domestic policy to rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions.⁶

The United States and other parties to the Paris Agreement recognized “the need for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of climate change on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge.”⁷ The Paris Agreement articulates the practical steps necessary to obtain its goals: parties including the United States have to “reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions *as soon as possible* . . . and to *undertake rapid reductions* thereafter in accordance *with best available science*,”⁸ imperatively commanding that developed countries specifically “should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets”⁹ and that such actions reflect the “highest possible ambition.”¹⁰

The Paris Agreement codifies the international consensus that climate change is an “urgent threat” of global concern,¹¹ and commits all signatories to achieving a set of global goals. Importantly, the Paris Agreement commits all signatories to an articulated target to hold the long-term global average temperature “to *well below 2°C* above pre-industrial levels and to *pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C* above pre-industrial levels”¹² (emphasis added).

In light of the severe threats posed by even limited global warming, the Paris Agreement established the international goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels in order to “prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system,” as set forth in the UNFCCC, a treaty which the United States has ratified and to which it is bound.¹³ The Paris consensus on a 1.5°C warming goal reflects the findings of the IPCC and numerous scientific studies that indicate that 2°C warming would exceed thresholds for severe, extremely

³ Paris Agreement, Art. 20(1).

⁴ For purposes of this Petition, the term “treaty” refers to its international law definition, whereby a treaty is “an international law agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law” pursuant to article 2(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (Jan. 27, 1980).

⁵ See U.S. Department of State, Background Briefing on the Paris Climate Agreement, (Dec. 12, 2015), <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/12/250592.htm>.

⁶ Although not every provision in the Paris Agreement is legally binding or enforceable, the U.S. and all parties are committed to perform the treaty commitments in good faith under the international legal principle of *pacta sunt servanda* (“agreements must be kept”). Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 26.

⁷ *Id.*, Recitals.

⁸ *Id.*, Art. 4(1).

⁹ *Id.*, Art. 4(4).

¹⁰ *Id.*, Art. 4(3).

¹¹ *Id.*, Recitals.

¹² *Id.*, Art. 2.

¹³ See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun Agreement. Available at <http://cancun.unfccc.int/> (last visited Jan 7, 2015); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen Accord. Available at http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php (last accessed Jan 7, 2015). The United States Senate ratified the UNFCCC on October 7, 1992. See <https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/102nd-congress/38>.

dangerous, and potentially irreversible impacts.¹⁴ Those impacts include increased global food and water insecurity, the inundation of coastal regions and small island nations by sea level rise and increasing storm surge, complete loss of Arctic summer sea ice, irreversible melting of the Greenland ice sheet, increased extinction risk for at least 20-30% of species on Earth, dieback of the Amazon rainforest, and “rapid and terminal” declines of coral reefs worldwide.¹⁵ As scientists noted, the impacts associated with 2°C temperature rise have been “revised upwards, sufficiently so that 2°C now more appropriately represents the threshold between ‘dangerous’ and ‘extremely dangerous’ climate change.”¹⁶ Consequently, a target of 1.5 °C or less temperature rise is now seen as essential to avoid dangerous climate change and has largely supplanted the 2°C target that had been the focus of most climate literature until recently.

Immediate and aggressive greenhouse gas emissions reductions are necessary to keep warming below a 1.5° or 2°C rise above pre-industrial levels. Put simply, there is only a finite amount of CO₂ that can be released into the atmosphere without rendering the goal of meeting the 1.5°C target virtually impossible. A slightly larger amount could be burned before meeting a 2°C became an impossibility. Globally, fossil fuel reserves, if all were extracted and burned, would release enough CO₂ to exceed this limit several times over.¹⁷

The question of what amount of fossil fuels can be extracted and burned without negating a realistic chance of meeting a 1.5 or 2°C target is relatively easy to answer, even if the answer is framed in probabilities and ranges. The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report and other expert assessments have established global carbon budgets, or the total amount of remaining carbon that can be burned while maintain some probability of staying below a given temperature target. According to the IPCC, total cumulative anthropogenic emissions of CO₂ must remain below about 1,000 gigatonnes (GtCO₂) from 2011 onward for a 66% probability of limiting warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels.¹⁸ Given more than 100 GtCO₂ have been emitted since 2011,¹⁹

¹⁴ See Paris Agreement, Art. 2(1)(a); U); U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice, Report on the structured expert dialogue on the 2013-15 review, No. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1 at 15-16 (June 2015); IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report at 65 & Box 2.4.

¹⁵ See Jones, C. et al, Committed Terrestrial Ecosystem Changes due to Climate Change, 2 Nature Geoscience 484, 484–487 (2009); Smith, J. B. et al., Assessing Dangerous Climate Change Through an Update of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ‘Reasons for Concern’, 106 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 4133, 4133–37 (2009); ; Veron, J. E. N. et al., The Coral Reef Crisis: The Critical Importance of <350 ppm CO₂, 58 Marine Pollution Bulletin 1428, 1428–36, (2009); ; Warren, R. J. et al., Increasing Impacts of Climate Change Upon Ecosystems with Increasing Global Mean Temperature Rise, 106 Climatic Change 141–77 (2011); Hare, W. W. et al., Climate Hotspots: Key Vulnerable Regions, Climate Change and Limits to Warming, 11 Regional Environmental Change 1, 1–13 (2011); ; Frieler, K. M. et al., Limiting Global Warming to 2°C is Unlikely to Save Most Coral Reefs, Nature Climate Change, Published Online (2013) doi: 10.1038/NCLIMATE1674; ; M. Schaeffer et al., Adequacy and Feasibility of the 1.5°C Long-Term Global Limit, Climate Analytics (2013).

¹⁶ Anderson, K. and A. Bows, Beyond ‘Dangerous’ Climate Change: Emission Scenarios for a New World, 369 Philosophical Transactions, Series A, Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences 20, 20–44 (2011).

¹⁷ Marlene Cmons, Keep It In the Ground 6 (Sierra Club et al., Jan. 25, 2016).

¹⁸ IPCC, 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; Summary for Policymakers at 27; IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change at 64 & Table 2.2 [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)] at 63-64 & Table 2.2 (“IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report”).

¹⁹ From 2012-2014, 107 GtCO₂ was emitted (see Annual Global Carbon Emissions at <http://co2now.org/Current->

the remaining portion of the budget under this scenario is well below 900 GtCO₂. To have an 80% probability of staying below the 2°C target, the budget from 2000 is 890 GtCO₂, with less than 430 GtCO₂ remaining.²⁰

To have even a 50% probability of achieving the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels equates to a carbon budget of 550-600 GtCO₂ from 2011 onward,²¹ of which more than 100 GtCO₂ has already been emitted. To achieve a 66% probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C requires adherence to a more stringent carbon budget of only 400 GtCO₂ from 2011 onward,²² of which less than 300 GtCO₂ remained at the start of 2015. An 80% probability budget for 1.5°C would have far less than 300 GtCO₂ remaining. Given that global CO₂ emissions in 2014 alone totaled 36 GtCO₂,²³ humanity is rapidly consuming the remaining burnable carbon budget needed to have even a 50/50 chance of meeting the 1.5°C temperature goal.²⁴

According to a recent report by EcoShift Consulting commissioned by the Center and Friends of the Earth, unleased (and thus unburnable) federal fossil fuels represent a significant source of potential greenhouse gas emissions:

- Potential GHG emissions of federal fossil fuels (leased and unleased) if developed would release up to 492 gigatons (Gt) (one gigaton equals 1 billion tons) of carbon dioxide equivalent pollution (CO₂e); representing 46 percent to 50 percent of potential emissions from all remaining U.S. fossil fuels.
- Of that amount, up to 450 Gt CO₂e have not yet been leased to private industry for extraction;
- Releasing those 450 Gt CO₂e (the equivalent annual pollution of more than 118,000 coal-fired power plants) would be greater than any proposed U.S. share of global carbon limits that would keep emissions below scientifically advised levels.

Fracking has also opened up vast reserves that otherwise would not be available, increasing the potential greenhouse gas emissions that can be released into the atmosphere. BLM

CO₂/CO₂-Now/global-carbon-emissions.html).

²⁰ Carbon Tracker Initiative, Unburnable Carbon – Are the world’s financial markets carrying a carbon bubble? available at <http://www.carbontracker.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Unburnable-Carbon-Full-rev2-1.pdf>; Meinshausen, M. *et al.*, Greenhouse gas emission targets for limiting global warming to 2 degrees Celsius, 458 Nature 1158, 1159 (2009)

²¹ IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report at 64 & Table 2.2.

²² *Id.*

²³ See Global Carbon Emissions, <http://co2now.org/Current-CO2/CO2-Now/global-carbon-emissions.html>

²⁴ In addition to limits on the *amount* of fossil fuels that can be utilized, emissions pathways compatible with a 1.5 or 2°C target also have a significant temporal element. Leading studies make clear that to reach a reasonable likelihood of stopping warming at 1.5° or even 2°C, global CO₂ emissions must be phased out by mid-century and likely as early as 2040-2045. See, e.g. Joeri Rogelj *et al.*, Energy system transformations for limiting end-of-century warming to below 1.5°C, 5 Nature Climate Change 519, 522 (2015). United States focused studies indicate that we must phase out fossil fuel CO₂ emissions even earlier—between 2025 and 2040—for a reasonable chance of staying below 2°C. See, e.g. Climate Action Tracker, <http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa>. Issuing new legal entitlements to explore for and extract federal fossil fuels for decades to come is wholly incompatible with such a transition.

must consider a ban on this dangerous practice and a ban on new leasing to prevent the worst effects of climate change.

B. BLM Must Consider A Ban on New Oil and Gas Leasing and Fracking in a Programmatic Review and Halt All New Leasing and Fracking in the Meantime.

Development of unleased oil and gas resources will fuel climate disruption and undercut the needed transition to a clean energy economy. As BLM has not yet had a chance to consider no leasing and no-fracking alternatives as part of any of its RMP planning processes or a comprehensive review of its federal oil and gas leasing program, BLM should suspend new leasing until it properly considers this alternative in updated RMPs or a programmatic EIS for the entire leasing program. BLM demonstrably has tools available to consider the climate consequences of its leasing programs, and alternatives available to mitigate those consequences, at either a regional or national scale.²⁵

BLM would be remiss to continue leasing when it has never stepped back and taken a hard look at this problem at the programmatic scale. Before allowing more oil and gas extraction in the planning area, BLM must: (1) comprehensively analyze the total greenhouse gas emissions which result from past, present, and potential future fossil fuel leasing and all other activities across all BLM lands and within the various planning areas at issue here, (2) consider their cumulative significance in the context of global climate change, carbon budgets, and other greenhouse gas pollution sources outside BLM lands and the planning area, and (3) formulate measures that avoid or limit their climate change effects. By continuing leasing and allowing new fracking in the absence of any overall plan addressing climate change BLM is effectively burying its head in the sand.

A programmatic review and moratorium on new leasing would be consistent with the Secretary of Interior's recent order to conduct a comprehensive, programmatic EIS (PEIS) on its coal leasing program, in light of the need to take into account the program's impacts on climate change, among other issues, and "the lack of any recent analysis of the Federal coal program as a whole." *See* Secretary of Interior, Order No. 3338, § 4 (Jan. 15, 2016). Specifically, the Secretary directed that the PEIS "should examine how best to assess the climate impacts of continued Federal coal production and combustion and how to address those impacts in the management of the program to meet both the Nation's energy needs and its climate goals, as well as how best to protect the public lands from climate change impacts." *Id.* § 4(c).

The Secretary also ordered a moratorium on new coal leasing while such a review is being conducted. The Secretary reasoned:

Lease sales and lease modifications result in lease terms of 20 years and for so long thereafter as coal is produced in commercial quantities. Continuing to conduct lease sales or approve lease modifications during this programmatic

²⁵ *See, e.g.*, BLM Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota, Climate Change Supplementary Information Report (updated Oct. 2010) (conducting GHG inventory for BLM leasing in Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota); BLM, Proposed Rule: Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81 Fed. Reg. 6615 (Feb. 8, 2016) (proposing BLM-wide rule for prevention of methane waste).

review risks locking in for decades the future development of large quantities of coal under current rates and terms that the PEIS may ultimately determine to be less than optimal. This risk is why, during the previous two programmatic reviews, the Department halted most lease sales with limited exceptions.... Considering these factors and given the extensive recoverable reserves of Federal coal currently under lease, I have decided that a similar policy is warranted here. A pause on leasing, with limited exceptions, will allow future leasing decisions to benefit from the recommendations that result from the PEIS while minimizing any economic hardship during that review.

Id. § 5.

The Secretary's reasoning is also apt here. A programmatic review assessing the climate change effects of public fossil fuels is long overdue. And there is no shortage of oil and gas that would preclude a moratorium while such a review is conducted, as evidenced by very low natural oil and gas prices. More importantly, BLM should not "risk[] locking in for decades the future development of large quantities of [fossil fuels] under current...terms that a [programmatic review] may ultimately determine to be less than optimal." *Id.* BLM should cancel the sale and halt all new leasing and fracking until a programmatic review is completed.

C. BLM Must Study the Greenhouse Gas Impacts of New Leasing

As explained in the Center's comment on the Little Snake EA, social cost of carbon analysis is an appropriate tool for analyzing the cumulative impacts of greenhouse gas emissions, which the EA inexplicably fails to perform and BLM's response to comments fails to address. The effects of cumulative greenhouse gas emissions will have far-reaching impacts on natural and social systems, but the EA fails to provide any meaningful analysis of the proposed action's contribution to these effects. Likewise, the DNA for the Tres Rios lease auction is improper, because the social costs of carbon are not addressed in the San Juan National Forest LRMP EIS.

1. The effects of cumulative GHG emissions will inflict extraordinary harm to natural systems and communities

On December 12, 2015, nearly 200 governments, including the United States, agreed to the commitments enumerated in the Paris Agreement to "strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change"²⁶ The Paris Agreement codified the international consensus that the climate crisis is an urgent threat to human societies and the planet, with the parties recognizing that:

Climate change represents an *urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet* and thus requires the widest possible cooperation by all countries, and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, with a view to accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions (emphasis added).²⁷

²⁶ Paris Agreement, Art. 2(1).

²⁷ Paris Agreement, Decision, Recitals.

Numerous authoritative scientific assessments have established that climate change is causing grave harms to human society and natural systems, and these threats are becoming increasingly dangerous. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in its 2014 Fifth Assessment Report, stated that: “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases have increased” and that “[r]ecent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems.”²⁸

The 2014 Third National Climate Assessment, prepared by a panel of non-governmental experts and reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences and multiple federal agencies similarly stated that “That the planet has warmed is ‘unequivocal,’ and is corroborated though multiple lines of evidence, as is the conclusion that the causes are very likely human in origin”²⁹ and “[i]mpacts related to climate change are already evident in many regions and are expected to become increasingly disruptive across the nation throughout this century and beyond.”³⁰ The United States National Research Council similarly concluded that: “[c]limate change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses significant risks for—and in many cases is already affecting—a broad range of human and natural systems.”³¹

The IPCC and National Climate Assessment further decisively recognize the dominant role of fossil fuels in driving climate change:

While scientists continue to refine projections of the future, observations unequivocally show that climate is changing and that the warming of the past 50 years is primarily due to human-induced emissions of heat-trapping gases. These emissions come mainly from burning coal, oil, and gas, with additional contributions from forest clearing and some agricultural practices.³²

CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes contributed about 78% to the total GHG emission increase between 1970 and 2010, with a contribution of similar percentage over the 2000–2010 period (*high confidence*).³³

These impacts ultimately emanating from the extraction and combustion of fossil fuels are harming the United States in myriad ways, with the impacts certain to worsen over the

²⁸ IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report at 2.

²⁹ Melillo, Jerry M., Terese (T.C.) Richmond, and Gary W. Yohe, Eds., 2014: Climate Change Impacts in the United States: The Third National Climate Assessment(U.S. Global Change Research Program). doi:10.7930/J0Z31WJ2 (“Third National Climate Assessment”) at 61 (quoting IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, S. Solomon, D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K. B. Averyt, M. Tignor, and H. L. Miller, Eds., Cambridge University Press, 1-18.).

³⁰ Third National Climate Assessment at 10.

³¹ National Research Council, Advancing the Science of Climate Change (2010), available at www.nap.edu. (“Advancing the Science of Climate Change”) at 2.

³² Third National Climate Assessment at 2.

³³ IPCC AR5 Synthesis Report at 46.

coming decades absent deep reductions in domestic and global GHG emissions. EPA recognized these threats in its 2009 Final Endangerment Finding under Clean Air Act Section 202(a), concluding that greenhouse gases from fossil fuel combustion endanger public health and welfare: “the body of scientific evidence compellingly supports [the] finding” that “greenhouse gases in the atmosphere may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health and to endanger public welfare.”³⁴ In finding that climate change endangers public health and welfare, EPA has acknowledged the overwhelming evidence of the documented and projected effects of climate change upon the nation:

Effects on air quality: “The evidence concerning adverse air quality impacts provides strong and clear support for an endangerment finding. Increases in ambient ozone are expected to occur over broad areas of the country, and they are expected to increase serious adverse health effects in large population areas that are and may continue to be in nonattainment. The evaluation of the potential risks associated with increases in ozone in attainment areas also supports such a finding.”³⁵

Effects on health from increased temperatures: “The impact on mortality and morbidity associated with increases in average temperatures, which increase the likelihood of heat waves, also provides support for a public health endangerment finding.”³⁶

Increased chance of extreme weather events: “The evidence concerning how human induced climate change may alter extreme weather events also clearly supports a finding of endangerment, given the serious adverse impacts that can result from such events and the increase in risk, even if small, of the occurrence and intensity of events such as hurricanes and floods. Additionally, public health is expected to be adversely affected by an increase in the severity of coastal storm events due to rising sea levels.”³⁷

Impacts to water resources: “Water resources across large areas of the country are at serious risk from climate change, with effects on water supplies, water quality, and adverse effects from extreme events such as floods and droughts. Even areas of the country where an increase in water flow is projected could face water resource problems from the supply and water quality problems associated with temperature increases and precipitation variability, as well as the increased risk of serious adverse effects from extreme events, such as floods and drought. The severity of risks and impacts is likely to increase over time with accumulating greenhouse gas concentrations and associated temperature increases.”³⁸

Impacts from sea level rise: “The most serious potential adverse effects are the increased risk of storm surge and flooding in coastal areas from sea level rise and more intense storms. Observed sea level rise is already increasing the risk of storm surge and flooding in some coastal areas. The conclusion in the assessment literature that there is the potential for hurricanes to become more intense (and even some evidence that Atlantic hurricanes have already become

³⁴ Final Endangerment Finding, 74 Fed. Reg. at 66,497.

³⁵ *Id.*

³⁶ *Id.*

³⁷ *Id.* at 66,497-98.

³⁸ *Id.* at 66,498.

more intense) reinforces the judgment that coastal communities are now endangered by human-induced climate change, and may face substantially greater risk in the future. Even if there is a low probability of raising the destructive power of hurricanes, this threat is enough to support a finding that coastal communities are endangered by greenhouse gas air pollution. In addition, coastal areas face other adverse impacts from sea level rise such as land loss due to inundation, erosion, wetland submergence, and habitat loss. The increased risk associated with these adverse impacts also endangers public welfare, with an increasing risk of greater adverse impacts in the future.”³⁹

Impacts to energy, infrastructure, and settlements: “Changes in extreme weather events threaten energy, transportation, and water resource infrastructure. Vulnerabilities of industry, infrastructure, and settlements to climate change are generally greater in high-risk locations, particularly coastal and riverine areas, and areas whose economies are closely linked with climate-sensitive resources. Climate change will likely interact with and possibly exacerbate ongoing environmental change and environmental pressures in settlements, particularly in Alaska where indigenous communities are facing major environmental and cultural impacts on their historic lifestyles.”⁴⁰

Impacts to wildlife: “Over the 21st century, changes in climate will cause some species to shift north and to higher elevations and fundamentally rearrange U.S. ecosystems. Differential capacities for range shifts and constraints from development, habitat fragmentation, invasive species, and broken ecological connections will likely alter ecosystem structure, function, and services, leading to predominantly negative consequences for biodiversity and the provision of ecosystem goods and services.”⁴¹

In addition to these acknowledged impacts on public health and welfare more generally, climate change is causing and will continue to cause serious impacts on natural resources that the Department of Interior is specifically charged with safeguarding.⁴²

Impacts to Public Lands: Climate change is causing and will continue to cause specific impacts to public lands ecosystem services. Although public lands provide a variety of difficult-to-quantify public benefits, one recent Forest Service attempt at quantification estimates the public land ecosystem services at risk from climate change at between \$14.5 and \$36.1 billion annually.⁴³ In addition to the general loss of ecosystem services, irreplaceable species and aesthetic and recreational treasures are at risk of permanent destruction. High temperatures are causing loss of glaciers in Glacier National Park; the Park’s glaciers are expected to disappear entirely by 2030, with ensuing warming of stream temperatures and adverse effects to aquatic ecosystems.⁴⁴ With effects of warming more pronounced at higher latitudes, tundra ecosystems

³⁹ *Id.*

⁴⁰ *Id.*

⁴¹ *Id.*; see also Third National Climate Assessment at 195-219.

⁴² See Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a)(8), 1712(c)(1); Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528; National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332.

⁴³ Esposito, Valerie et al., Climate Change and Ecosystem Services: The Contribution and Impacts on Federal Public Lands in the United States, USDA Forest Service Proceedings RMRS-P-64 at 155-164 (2011).

⁴⁴ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change and Public Lands (1999).

on Alaska public lands face serious declines, with potentially serious additional climate feedbacks from melting permafrost.⁴⁵ In Florida, the Everglades face severe ecosystem disruption from already-occurring saltwater incursion.⁴⁶ Sea level rise will further damage freshwater ecosystems and the endangered species that rely on them.

Impacts to Biodiversity and Ecosystems: Across the United States ecosystems and biodiversity, including those on public lands, are directly under siege from climate change—leading to the loss of iconic species and landscapes, negative effects on food chains, disrupted migrations, and the degradation of whole ecosystems.⁴⁷ Specifically, scientific evidence shows that climate change is already causing changes in distribution, phenology, physiology, genetics, species interactions, ecosystem services, demographic rates, and population viability: many animals and plants are moving poleward and upward in elevation, shifting their timing of breeding and migration, and experiencing population declines and extirpations.⁴⁸ Because climate change is occurring at an unprecedented pace with multiple synergistic impacts, climate change is predicted to result in catastrophic species losses during this century. For example, the IPCC concluded that 20% to 30% of plant and animal species will face an increased risk of extinction if global average temperature rise exceeds 1.5°C to 2.5°C relative to 1980-1999, with an increased risk of extinction for up to 70% of species worldwide if global average temperature exceeds 3.5°C relative to 1980-1999.⁴⁹

In sum, climate change, driven primarily by the combustion of fossil fuels, poses a severe and immediate threat to the health, welfare, ecosystems and economy of the United States. These impacts are felt across the nation, including upon the public lands the Secretary of the Interior is charged with safeguarding. A rapid and deep reduction of emissions generated from fossil fuels is essential if such threats are to be minimized and their impacts mitigated.

2. *The EA ignores the social cost of carbon tool to analyze the cumulative contribution of increased oil and gas development on climate change*

As explained in the Center’s comment on the EA, although cost-benefit analysis is not necessarily the ideal or exclusive method for assessing contributions to an adverse effect as enormous, uncertain, and potentially catastrophic as climate change, BLM does have tools available to provide one approximation of external costs and has previously performed a “social cost of carbon” analysis in prior environmental reviews.⁵⁰ Its own internal memo identifies one

⁴⁵ See National Climate Assessment at 48; MacDougall, A. H., et al., Significant contribution to climate warming from the permafrost carbon feedback, 5 *Nature Geoscience* 719-721 (2012), doi:10.1038/ngeo1573.

⁴⁶ See National Climate Assessment at 592; Foti, R., Met al., Signs of critical transition in the Everglades wetlands in response to climate and anthropogenic changes, 110 *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 6296-6300, (2013), doi:10.1073/pnas.1302558110.

⁴⁷ National Climate Assessment at 13.

⁴⁸ See Parmesan, C. and G. Yohe, A globally coherent fingerprint of climate change impacts across natural systems, 421 *Nature* 37–42 (2003); Root, T. et al., Fingerprints of global warming on wild animals and plants, 421 *Nature* 57–60 (2003); Chen, I. et al., Rapid range shifts of species associated with high levels of climate warming, 333 *Science* 1024–1026 (2011).

⁵⁰ See *High Country Conserv’n Advocates v. United States Forest Serv.*, 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 87820 (D. Colo. 2014) (invalidating environmental assessment [“EA”] for improperly omitting social cost of carbon analysis, where BLM had included it in preliminary analysis); Taylor, P., “BLM crafting guidance on social cost of carbon --

available analytical tool: “For federal agencies the authoritative estimates of [social cost of carbon] are provided by the 2013 technical report of the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, which was convened by the Council of Economic Advisers and the Office of Management and Budget.”⁵¹ As explained in that report:

The purpose of the “social cost of carbon” (SCC) estimates presented here is to allow agencies to incorporate the social benefits of reducing carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions into cost-benefit analyses of regulatory actions that impact cumulative global emissions. The SCC is an estimate of the monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in carbon emissions in a given year. It is intended to include (but is not limited to) changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem services due to climate change.⁵²

Further, other analytical tools exist to evaluate the cost of methane emissions.⁵³ EPA has peer reviewed and employed such a tool in its “Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Proposed Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas Sector.”⁵⁴

Leasing and development of unconventional wells could exact extraordinary financial costs to communities and future generations, setting aside the immeasurable loss of irreplaceable, natural values that can never be recovered. BLM’s environmental review must provide an accounting of these potential harms and costs. The EA and BLM’s response to comments fail to adequately respond to our comments on this issue.

internal memo,” Greenwire, April 15, 2015, *available at* <http://www.eenews.net/greenwire/stories/1060016810/>; BLM Internal Memo from Assistant Director of Resources and Planning Ed Roberson (“Roberson Internal Memo”), April 2015, *available at* http://www.eenews.net/assets/2015/04/15/document_gw_01.pdf (noting “some BLM field offices have included estimates of the [social cost of carbon] in project-level NEPA documents”) (accessed July 29, 2015); *see also* Council on Environmental Quality, Revised Draft Guidance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Climate Change Impacts, p. 18, *available at* www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/nepa/ghg-guidance (accessed Jul 29, 2015) (quantitative analysis required if GHGs > 25k tons/yr).

⁵¹ BLM, Roberson Internal Memo.

⁵² *See* Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States Government, Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis - Under Executive Order 12866, May 2013, *available at* https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/social_cost_of_carbon_for_ria_2013_update.pdf (accessed July 29, 2015); *see also* Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, United States Government, Technical Support Document: Social Cost of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, Feb. 2010, *available at* <http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf> (accessed July 29, 2015).

⁵³ *See* Marten A.L., Kopits K.A., Griffiths C.W., Newbold S.C., Wolverton A. 2014, online publication (2015, print publication). “Incremental CH₄ and N₂O mitigation benefits consistent with the US Government’s SC-CO₂ estimates,” *Climate Policy* 15(2):272-298, abstract available at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2014.912981>.

⁵⁴ *See* USEPA, Social Cost of Carbon, *available at* <http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/economics/scc.html> (noting application of social cost of methane supported by peer review); USEPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis of the Proposed Emission Standards for New and Modified Sources in the Oil and Natural Gas Sector, Ch. 4, *available at* http://www3.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/og_prop_ria_081815.pdf.

II. The Significant Public Health Impacts of Increased Fracking Compel Consideration of No Leasing and No Fracking Alternatives

In addition to climate change effects, oil and gas leasing and fracking entail significant public health risks that should compel BLM to consider a ban on these practices in a programmatic review and in the current leasing proposal. The EA fails to study these public health risks, precluding meaningful review of the proposed action.

Ample scientific evidence indicates that well development and well stimulation activities have been linked to an array of adverse human health effects, including carcinogenic, developmental, reproductive, and endocrine disruption effects. This is all the more alarming when considering how close wells may be developed to schools, residences, and businesses under BLM's proposed leasing decision. *See* Cities Map. Just as troubling, is how much is *unknown* about the chemicals used in well stimulation activities.⁵⁵ The potential human health dangers and the precautionary principle should further compel BLM to consider not allowing further development of oil and gas minerals in the areas for lease. In comparing the no-leasing and no-fracking alternatives to leasing and continued unconventional well development scenarios, BLM should include a health impact assessment, or equivalent, of the aggregate impact that unconventional extraction techniques, including fracking, will have on human health and nearby communities.

Due to the heavy and frequent use of chemicals, proximity to fracked wells is associated with higher rates of cancer, birth defects, poor infant health, and acute health effects for nearby residents who must endure long-term exposure:

- In one study, residents living within one-half mile of a fracked well were significantly more likely to develop cancer than those who live more than one-half mile away, with exposure to benzene being the most significant risk.⁵⁶
- Another study found that pregnant women living within 10 miles of a fracked well were more likely to bear children with congenital heart defects and possibly neural tube defects.⁵⁷ A separate study independently found the same pattern; infants born near fracked gas wells had more health problems than infants born near sites that had not yet conducted fracking.^{58, 59}
- A study analyzed Pennsylvania birth records from 2004 to 2011 to assess the health of infants born within a 2.5-kilometer radius of natural-gas fracking sites. They found that

⁵⁵ *See, e.g.* EPA 2015 at 5-73, 10-7.

⁵⁶ McKenzie, L. et al., Human Health Risk Assessment of Air Emissions from Development of Unconventional Natural Gas Resources, 424 Science of the Total Environment 79 (2012) ("McKenzie 2012").

⁵⁷ McKenzie, L. et al., Birth Outcomes and Maternal Residential Proximity to Natural Gas Development in Rural Colorado, Advance Publication Environmental Health Perspectives (Jan. 28, 2014), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1289/ehp.1306722> ("McKenzie 2014").

⁵⁸ Hill, Elaine L., Unconventional Natural Gas Development and Infant Health: Evidence from Pennsylvania, Cornell University (2012).

⁵⁹ Whitehouse, Mark, *Study Shows Fracking is Bad for Babies*, Bloomberg View, Jan. 4, 2014, available at <http://www.bloombergvew.com/articles/2014-01-04/study-shows-fracking-is-bad-for-babies>.

proximity to fracking increased the likelihood of low birth weight by more than half, from about 5.6 percent to more than 9 percent.⁶⁰ The chances of a low Apgar score, a summary measure of the health of newborn children, roughly doubled, to more than 5 percent.⁶¹ Another recent Pennsylvania study found a correlation between proximity to unconventional gas drilling and higher incidence of lower birth weight and small-for-gestational-age babies.⁶²

- A recent study found increased rates of cardiology-patient hospitalizations in zip codes with greater number of unconventional oil and gas wells and higher well density in Pennsylvania.⁶³ The results suggested that if a zip code went from having zero wells to well density greater than 0.79 wells/km², the number of cardiology-patient hospitalizations per 100 people (or “cardiology inpatient prevalence rate”) in that zip code would increase by 27%. If a zip code went from having zero wells to a well density of 0.17 to 0.79 wells/km², a 14% increase in cardiology inpatient prevalence rates would be expected. Further, higher rates of neurology-patient hospitalizations were correlated with zip codes with higher well density.
- Recently published reports indicate that people living in proximity to fracked gas wells commonly report skin rashes and irritation, nausea or vomiting, headache, dizziness, eye irritation and throat irritation.⁶⁴
- In Texas, a jury awarded nearly \$3 million to a family who lived near a well that was hydraulically fractured.⁶⁵ The family complained that they experienced migraines, rashes, dizziness, nausea and chronic nosebleeds. Medical tests showed one of the plaintiffs had more than 20 toxic chemicals in her bloodstream.⁶⁶ Air samples around their home also showed the presence of BTEX — benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene —colorless but toxic chemicals typically found in petroleum products.⁶⁷

Chemicals used for fracking also put nearby residents at risk of endocrine disruption effects. A study that sampled water near active wells and known spill sites in Garfield County Colorado found alarming levels of estrogenic, antiestrogenic, androgenic, and antiandrogenic

⁶⁰ *Id.*, citing Janet Currie of Princeton University, Katherine Meckel of Columbia University, and John Deutch and Michael Greenstone of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

⁶¹ *Id.*

⁶² Stacy, Shaina L. et al. (2015) Perinatal Outcomes and Unconventional Natural Gas Operations in Southwest Pennsylvania. PLoS ONE 10(6): e0126425. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126425, available at <http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0126425>.

⁶³ Jemielital, T. et al. Unconventional Gas and Oil Drilling Is Associated with Increased Hospital Utilization Rates. PLoS ONE 10(7): e0131093, available at <http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0131093>.

⁶⁴ Rabinowitz, P.M. et al., Proximity to Natural Gas Wells and Reported Health Status: Results of a Household Survey in Washington County, Pennsylvania. Environmental Health Perspectives Advance Publication (2014); Bamberger, Michelle and R.E. Oswald, Impacts of Gas Drilling on Human and Animal Health, 22 New Solutions 51 (2012); Steinzor, N. et al., Gas Patch Roulette: How Shale Development Risks Public Health in Pennsylvania, Earthworks Gas & Oil Accountability Project (2012).

⁶⁵ *Parr v. Aruba Petroleum, Inc.*, Case No. 11-01650-E (Dallas Cty., filed Sept.13, 2013).

⁶⁶ Deam, Jenny, *Jury Awards Texas family Nearly \$3 million in Fracking Case*, Los Angeles Times (Apr. 3, 2014) <http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-fracking-lawsuit-20140424-story.html>.

⁶⁷ *Id.*

activities, indicating that endocrine system disrupting chemicals (EDC) threaten to contaminate surface and groundwater sources for nearby residents.⁶⁸ The study concluded:

[M]ost water samples from sites with known drilling-related incidents in a drilling-dense region of Colorado exhibited more estrogenic, antiestrogenic, and/or antiandrogenic activities than the water samples collected from reference sites[,] and 12 chemicals used in drilling operations exhibited similar activities. Taken together, the following support an association between natural gas drilling operations and EDC activity in surface and ground water: [1] hormonal activities in Garfield County spill sites and the Colorado River are higher than those in reference sites in Garfield County and in Missouri, [2] selected drilling chemicals displayed activities similar to those measured in water samples collected from a drilling-dense region, [3] several of these chemicals and similar compounds were detected by other researchers at our sample collection sites, and [4] known spills of natural gas fluids occurred at these spill sites.

The study also noted a linkage between EDCs and “negative health outcomes in laboratory animals, wildlife, and humans”:

Despite an understanding of adverse health outcomes associated with exposure to EDCs, research on the potential health implications of exposure to chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing is lacking. Bamberger and Oswald (26) analyzed the health consequences associated with exposure to chemicals used in natural gas operations and found respiratory, gastrointestinal, dermatologic, neurologic, immunologic, endocrine, reproductive, and other negative health outcomes in humans, pets, livestock, and wildlife species.

Of note, site 4 in the current study was used as a small-scale ranch before the produced water spill in 2004. This use had to be discontinued because the animals no longer produced live offspring, perhaps because of the high antiestrogenic activity observed at this site. There is evidence that hydraulic fracturing fluids are associated with negative health outcomes, and there is a critical need to quickly and thoroughly evaluate the overall human and environmental health impact of this process. It should be noted that although this study focused on only estrogen and androgen receptors, there is a need for evaluation of other hormone receptor activities to provide a more complete endocrine-disrupting profile associated with natural gas drilling.⁶⁹

Operational accidents also pose a significant threat to public health. For example in August 2008, Newsweek reported that an employee of an energy-services company got caught in a fracking fluid spill and was taken to the emergency room, complaining of nausea and

⁶⁸ Kassotis, Christopher D. et al., Estrogen and Androgen Receptor Activities of Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals and Surface and Ground Water in a Drilling-Dense Region. *Endocrinology*, March 2014, 155(3):897–907, pp. 905–906, available at <http://press.endocrine.org/doi/full/10.1210/en.2013-1697>.

⁶⁹ *Id.*, p. 905.

headaches.⁷⁰ The fracking fluid was so toxic that it ended up harming not only the worker, but also the emergency room nurse who treated him. Several days later, after she began vomiting and retaining fluid, her skin turned yellow and she was diagnosed with chemical poisoning.⁷¹

Harmful chemicals are also found in the flowback fluid after well stimulation events. Flowback fluid is a key component of oil-industry wastewater from stimulated wells. A survey of chemical analyses of flowback fluid dating back to April 2014 in California revealed that concentrations of benzene, a known carcinogen, were detected at levels over 1,500 times the federal limits for drinking water.⁷² Of the 329 available tests that measured for benzene, the chemical was detected at levels in excess of federal limits in 320 tests (97 percent).⁷³ On average, benzene levels were around 700 times the federal limit for drinking water.⁷⁴ Among other carcinogenic or otherwise dangerous chemicals found in flowback fluid from fracked wells are toluene and chromium-6.⁷⁵ These hazardous substances were detected in excess of federal limits for drinking water in over one hundred tests. This dangerous fluid is commonly disposed of in injection wells, which often feed into aquifers, including some that could be used for drinking water and irrigation.

Acidizing presents similarly alarming risks to public health and safety. In acidizing operations, large volumes of hydrochloric and hydrofluoric acid are transported to the site and injected underground. These chemicals are highly dangerous due to their corrosive properties and ability to trigger tissue corrosion and damage to sensory organs through contact.

While many risks are known, much more is unknown about the hundreds of chemicals used in fracking. The identity and effects of many of these additives is unknown, due to operators' claims of confidential business information. But, as the EPA recognizes, chemical identities are "necessary to understand their chemical, physical, and toxicological properties, which determine how they might move through the environment to drinking water resources and any resulting effects."⁷⁶ Compounds in mixtures can have synergistic or antagonistic effects, but again, it is impossible to know these effects without full disclosure.⁷⁷ The lack of this information also precludes effective remediation: "Knowing their identities would also help inform what chemicals to test for in the event of suspected drinking water impacts and, in the

⁷⁰ Wiserman, Hannah, *Untested Waters: the Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation*, *Fordham Envtl. Law Rev.* 115 (2009), 138-39.

⁷¹ *Id.*

⁷² California Department of Conservation Division of Oil, Gas, & Geothermal Resources, *California Well Stimulation Public Disclosure Report*, available at <http://www.conservation.ca.gov/dog/Pages/WellStimulationTreatmentDisclosure.aspx>. The highest concentration was 7,700 parts per billion (ppb) for a well with API number 03052587. The US EPA's maximum contaminant level for benzene is 5 ppb.

⁷³ *Id.*

⁷⁴ *Id.*, see also Cart, J., *High Levels of Benzene Found in Fracking Wastewater*, *Los Angeles Times*, Feb. 11, 2015, <http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-fracking-20150211-story.html#page=1>.

⁷⁵ *Id.*; see also Center for Biological Diversity, *Cancer-causing Chemicals Found in Fracking Flowback from California Oil Wells* (2015) Feb. 11, 2015, available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2015/fracking-02-11-2015.html.

⁷⁶ EPA 2015 at 10-18.

⁷⁷ Souther, Sara et al. *Biotic Impacts of Energy Development from Shale: Research Priorities and Knowledge Gaps*, *Front Ecol Environ* 2014; 12(6): p. 334.

case of wastewater, may help predict whether current treatment systems are effective at removing them.”⁷⁸

Even where chemical identities are known, chemical safety data may be limited. In EPA’s study of the hazards of fracking chemicals to drinking water, EPA found that “[o]ral reference values and oral slope factors meeting the criteria used in this assessment were not available for the majority of chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing fluids [87%], representing a significant data gap for hazard identification.”⁷⁹ Without this data, EPA could not adequately assess potential impacts on drinking water resources and human health.⁸⁰ Further, of 1,076 hydraulic fracturing fluid chemicals identified by the EPA, 623 did not have estimated physiochemical properties reported in EPA’s toxics database, although this information is “essential to predicting how and where it will travel in the environment.”⁸¹ The data gaps are actually much larger, because EPA excluded 35% of fracking chemicals reported to FracFocus from its analysis because it could not assign them standardized chemical names.⁸²

The EA fails to incorporate a literature review of the harmful effects of each of the chemicals known to be used in fracking and other unconventional oil and gas extraction methods. Without knowing the effects of each chemical, the EA cannot accurately project the true impact of unconventional oil and gas extraction.

The EA also fails to study the human health and safety impacts of noise pollution, light pollution, and traffic accidents resulting from oil and gas development. A recent study found that automobile and truck accident rates in counties in Pennsylvania with heavy unconventional oil and gas extraction activity were between 15 and 65 percent higher than accident rates in counties without unconventional oil and gas extraction activities.⁸³ Rates of traffic fatalities and major injuries may be higher in areas with heavy drilling activity than areas without.⁸⁴

III. BLM and the Forest Service Must Analyze the Site-Specific and Cumulative Effects of Fracking in an EIS, or at Minimum, in an EA.

NEPA regulations and case law require that BLM and the Forest Service evaluate all “reasonably foreseeable” direct and indirect effects of its leasing. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8; *Davis v. Coleman*, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 1975); *Center for Biological Diversity, et al. v. Bureau of Land Management, et al.*, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52432 (N.D. Cal. March 31, 2013) (holding that oil and gas leases were issued in violation of NEPA where BLM failed to prepare an EIS and unreasonably concluded that the leases would have no significant environmental impact because the agency failed to take into account all reasonably foreseeable development under the leases). Oil and gas leasing is an irrevocable commitment to convey rights to use of federal land – a commitment with readily predictable environmental consequences that BLM and the Forest

⁷⁸ EPA 2015 at 10-18.

⁷⁹ *Id.* at 10-7, 9-7.

⁸⁰ *Id.* at 9-37-38.

⁸¹ *Id.* at 5-73.

⁸² *Id.* at 9-38.

⁸³ Graham, J., Irving et al., Increased Traffic Accident Rates Associated with Shale Gas Drilling in Pennsylvania. 74 Accident Analysis and Prevention 203 (2015).

⁸⁴ *Id.*

Service are required to address. These include the specific geological formations, greenhouse gas emissions, surface and ground water resources, seismic potential, or human, animal, and plant health and safety concerns present in the area to be leased. Analysis of the consequences of this practice, prior to irrevocable consequences, is therefore required at the leasing stage.

BLM's EA improperly tiers to the Little Snake Resource Management Plan Environmental Impact Statement (RMP EIS) for environmental analysis of various impacts that the EIS does not address. Likewise, its Determination of NEPA Adequacy improperly tiers to the San Juan National Forest LRMP EIS (LRMP EIS). Further, the Forest Service may not simply refer back to the LRMP EIS without performing site-specific analysis or making a determination as to its adequacy under NEPA.

BLM's EA and Determination of NEPA Adequacy fail to consider the impacts of hydraulically fracturing these specific leased parcels. There is not adequate analysis of wildlife impacts, seismic activity, health impacts, or many of the other known impacts of hydraulic fracturing. Around 90 percent of wells have used hydraulic fracking to get more gas flowing, according to the drilling industry.⁸⁵ With the very high probability that this practice will occur on the specific parcels it is arbitrary and capricious of BLM to neglect this highly controversial and impactful practice in its environmental analysis.

At a minimum, "the agency's [Environmental Assessment] must give a realistic evaluation of the total impacts and cannot isolate a proposed project, viewing it in a vacuum." *Grand Canyon Trust v. F.A.A.*, 290 F.3d 339, 342 (D.C. Cir. 2002). More specifically, "an environmental impact statement must analyze not only the direct impacts of a proposed action, but also the indirect and cumulative impacts." *Utahns for Better Transp. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.*, 305 F.3d 1152, 1172 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing *Custer County Action Assoc. v. Garvey*, 256 F.3d 1024, 1035 (10th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation omitted); *see also* 40 C.F.R. § 1509.25(a)(2) (2009) (scope of EIS is influenced by cumulative actions and impact); *Greenpeace v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.*, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1149 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (management plans were unlawful for failing to consider cumulative impacts on species). *Conner v. Burford* holds that the inability at the lease sale stage to fully ascertain effects of development "is not a justification for failing to estimate what those effects might be." *Conner v. Burford*, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988); *see also Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332 (1989).

Cumulative impact is defined as "the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2009). The Tenth Circuit recently noted that the BLM's own Handbook for Fluid Mineral Resources recognizes that "BLM has a statutory responsibility under NEPA to analyze and document the direct, indirect and cumulative impacts of past, present and reasonably foreseeable future actions resulting from Federally authorized fluid minerals activities." *Pennaco Energy Inc., v. U.S. Dep't of Interior*, 377 F.3d 1147, 1160 (10th Cir. 2004).

⁸⁵ http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/us/27gas.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all&

The sale of the parcels in the Little Snake planning area and the San Juan National Forest could foreseeably result in cumulative impacts to various local resources, which would result from increased hydraulic fracturing. This includes cumulative effects on local air quality as a result of increased traffic, drilling, methane venting and leakage, and construction; increased runoff pollution due to greater surface disturbance, new roads, and more vehicle traffic; cumulative effects on valuable habitat for sensitive species due to habitat fragmentation and noise; and industrialization of the landscape and degradation of scenic areas with increased well pads and other oil and gas infrastructure. The Little Snake RMP and the San Juan National Forest LRMP EIS did not address cumulative impacts within specific locales.

BLM and the Forest Service must conduct a thorough analysis of hydraulic fracturing to comply with their NEPA responsibilities. The analysis of hydraulic fracturing should require an Environmental Impact Statement due to its significant environmental impacts that have heretofore never been analyzed in the programmatic EISs underlying oil and gas leasing in these Field Offices and the San Juan National Forest. The Center's attached comment on the EA describes in greater detail foreseeable impacts that BLM and the Forest Service must address in an EIS, or at the very least, in an Environmental Assessment.

Finally, because the Forest Service retains discretion to consent or object to leasing, the Forest Service is obligated to review the lease sale's effects under NEPA, before allowing the Forest Service parcels to be auctioned. *See* 30 U.S.C. § 226(h) ("The Secretary of the Interior may not issue any lease on National Forest System Lands reserved from the public domain over the objection of the Secretary of Agriculture."). Reliance on the programmatic LRMP EIS does not fulfill the Forest Service's NEPA duties, when the Service still retains discretion to object to leasing, and the LRMP EIS fails to analyze site-specific effects of leasing. At minimum, the Forest Service must make a determination that the LRMP EIS is adequate to address the lease sale's effects under NEPA.

IV. BLM Must Reinitiate Consultation on the Programmatic Biological Opinions for the Endangered Fish

BLM must perform an adequate environmental review of the impacts of oil and gas development on ESA-listed species, including the endangered fish. In addition, it must perform an adequate section 7 consultation under the Endangered Species Act to ensure that the lease sale does not jeopardize the continued existence of these species.

Under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, BLM must consult with Fish and Wildlife Service regarding the impacts of increased drilling and associated water depletions on the endangered fish. Leasing of the parcels at issue would foreseeably entail significant water depletions within the upper Colorado River Basin watershed (including the Yampa and Little Snake River basins) and adversely affect endangered fish that inhabit areas downstream of the lease areas. While the 2008 "Programmatic Biological Opinion for Water Depletions Associated with Bureau of Land Management's Fluid Mineral Program within the Upper Colorado River Basin in Colorado" (PBO) is designed to address any depletions resulting from oil and gas development within the Little Snake Field Office and other western Colorado field offices, BLM can no longer rely on that consultation for its section 7 compliance. The PBO did not take into

account the massive water requirements of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.⁸⁶ These practices are expected to deplete enormous amounts of water to develop the Mancos shale play within the Grand Junction Field Office, and the Gothic Shale Gas Play (GSGP) and the Paradox Leasing Analysis Area in the Tres Rios Field Office. Nor did the PBO consider the use of these water-intensive practices throughout the rest of the programmatic action area, including the Little Snake, White River, and Colorado River Valley Field Offices.⁸⁷ In addition, the PBO does not consider climate change effects on Colorado River basin streamflows. BLM must reinitiate consultation on the PBO to take into account new information concerning the effects of climate change and reduced stream flows on the endangered fish. Further, because new information about climate change effects on stream flows has arisen since the Service's issuance of the "Programmatic Biological Opinion for Water Depletions Associated with BLM's Fluid Mineral Program on Public Lands within the San Juan River Basin" ("SJRB PBO"), BLM must reinitiate consultation on the SJRB PBO as well.

To the extent that approval of the lease sale would rely on the PBO, such reliance is arbitrary and cannot constitute BLM's section 7 compliance. BLM must either reinitiate consultation on the PBO or initiate section 7 consultation on the lease sale.

A. Water Depletions within the Tres Rios Field Office

BLM's Programmatic Biological Assessment (PBA) which informed the PBO estimated very low average water use per well within the Dolores River Basin. The PBA assumed that 1.1 acre-feet per well would be used to develop a single conventional well within the San Juan Public Lands Center, which includes the Dolores River Basin, and that a total of 700 wells would be developed over a 15-year period within this sub-watershed of the Upper Colorado River Basin.⁸⁸

The Tres Rios RMP EIS--published in 2013, five years after the PBO was adopted--however, reveals the potential for water use within the Dolores River Basin that could be many times higher than this amount:

Substantial quantities of water are projected to be used in the drilling, fracturing, and completion process for both the GSGP and Paradox conventional development (Table 3.5.4). The major river basins affected by the projected development in the PLAA are the Dolores and San Juan River Basins. GSGP gas wells in the Paradox Basin would use approximately 7.9 to 13.1 acre-feet of water per well in the drilling and completion process. This level of water consumption is 6 to 11 times the amount of water used to drill and complete a conventional gas well and 11 to 18 times the amount of water used to drill and complete a CBM gas well. Paradox conventional gas wells would use 3.3 acre-feet of water per well in the drilling and completion process. This level of water use is 2.5 times

⁸⁶ See Grand Junction Protest at 4-10.

⁸⁷ BLM Instruction Memorandum CO-2011-022 (April 11, 2011) ("All of the estimates in the PBO were based on using conventional vertical drilling technology.").

⁸⁸ PBA at 8.

the amount of water used to drill and complete other conventional wells and five times the amount of water used to drill and complete a CBM well.⁸⁹

The Tres Rios RMP EIS estimates the total amount of water depletions within the Dolores River Basin under existing and future leases over a 15-year period to be between 7,444 and 8,840 acre-feet, or approximately 496 acre-feet to 589 acre-feet per year.⁹⁰ This annual depletion rate is approximately ten times the amount of depletions that the PBA projected would occur in the San Juan Public Lands Center (51.8 acre-feet per year), despite that the PBA's estimated annual rate for this area includes development in other watersheds and not just the Dolores River Basin.⁹¹

B. Water Depletions within the Grand Junction Field Office

Water use within other areas of the Upper Colorado River Basin have also been grossly underestimated, because they fail to take into account increased horizontal drilling that could be used to develop the Mancos/Mowry and Niobrara shale plays, as well as the water depletion impacts of hydraulic fracturing.⁹² For example, under the Grand Junction RMP, over half of all wells developed within the GJFO could be horizontal wells, but the PBO did not take into account the greater water use of such wells.⁹³ Water depletion records maintained by the BLM Colorado State Office, indicate that horizontal wells depleted an average of 13.34 acre-feet of water per well between 2011 and 2014,⁹⁴ but the PBO assumed that within the Grand Junction planning area 0.77 acre-feet per well would be depleted.⁹⁵

Moreover, a water depletion log submitted by BLM to the Service on February 4, 2016 shows that in FY2015, nine horizontal wells were drilled in the Grand Junction Field Office and consumed an average of 68.98 acre-feet of fresh water or a total of 620.87 acre-feet of water.⁹⁶ In contrast, the PBO projected that on average each well would deplete only 0.77 acre-feet of water. The total amount of water depleted in the Colorado River *sub-basin* by all horizontal and vertical wells was 691.09 acre-feet of water, which exceeds the PBO's 379 acre-feet annual projection for this sub-basin by 1.8 times. BLM must perform a new consultation or reinstate consultation on the PBO to take into account the water depletion effects of horizontal drilling.

Further, horizontal drilling in the Upper Colorado River basin is likely to expand greatly, as the Mancos shale play becomes increasingly attractive to operators. According to an interview of a member of the American Association of Petroleum Geologists: "The Niobrara is the lower part of the Mancos in the Piceance Basin, and a number of horizontal Niobrara wells have now been drilled...If not for low gas prices, it probably would be one of the stronger shale gas plays

⁸⁹ Tres Rios RMP EIS at 244.

⁹⁰ *Id.* at 245.

⁹¹ The San Juan Public Lands Center includes the Columbine, Uncompahgre, and Gunnison Field Offices, Dolores Public Lands Center, and Pagosa Springs Public Lands Center. PBA at 8.

⁹² See Center for Biological Diversity Protest of White River RMP (April 27, 2015) at 3-9; Center for Biological Diversity Protest of Grand Junction RMP (2015) (May 11, 2015) at 3-9.

⁹³ See *id.*

⁹⁴ BLM 2011-2014 Water Depletion Logs submitted to Fish & Wildlife Service.

⁹⁵ PBA at 8.

⁹⁶ BLM, Water Depletion Log for FY2015 (Feb. 4, 2016).

in the country.”⁹⁷ One horizontal well developed by WPX in Garfield County in the Piceance Basin above Parachute Creek “averaged 12 million cubic feet a day over 30 days,” where initial production of a typical Piceance well is 1 million cubic feet per day.”⁹⁸ Encana has also drilled horizontal wells in the Piceance Basin, which are described as having “huge” initial output.⁹⁹

The increased water use within the Grand Junction planning area and other parts of the upper Colorado River Basin could alter the Service’s analysis of the lease sale’s effects on the endangered fish, as all BLM-authorized fluid mineral development activity within the Basin is part of a single programmatic action that impacts the endangered fish. Failure to take into account this new information would be arbitrary.

C. Impacts of Climate Change on the Upper Colorado River and San Juan River Basins

Anthropogenic climate change is profoundly impacting the Colorado River in ways that are altering temperature, streamflow, and the hydrologic cycle. Changes observed to date include rising temperatures, earlier snowmelt and streamflow, decreasing snowpack, and declining runoff and streamflow. Modeling studies project that these changes will only worsen, including continued declines in streamflow and intensification of drought. Climate change is likely to have significant effects on the endangered fish and the Colorado River ecosystem.

1. Rising temperatures

The Colorado River basin has warmed significantly during the past century, with average increases in surface temperature of 1.6°F (0.9°C) over the Southwest during 1901-2010 (Hoerling et al. 2013). The greatest warming has occurred in spring and summer, and in daytime high temperatures and nighttime low temperatures (Bonfils et al. 2008, Hoerling et al. 2013). Surface temperatures in the Southwest are projected to increase steeply in this century by an average of 4.5 to 7.9° F depending on the emissions scenario, with an average of 2.5 to 3°F of warming projected for 2021-2050 alone (Cayan et al. 2013). As explained below, warming temperatures are having significant effects on streamflow, drought severity, and the hydrologic cycle in the Southwest (Barnett et al. 2008, Woodhouse et al. 2016).

2. Earlier snowmelt and streamflow

In much of the Colorado River basin, snowmelt, snowmelt runoff, and streamflow timing have trended earlier since the mid-1950s, in parallel with warming temperatures (Hamlet et al. 2005, Stewart et al. 2005, Barnett et al. 2008, Hoerling et al. 2013, Garfin et al. 2014). The Colorado River basin’s spring pulse from 1978-2004 shifted to two weeks earlier compared to

⁹⁷ Durham, Louise S. “Mancos-Niobrara Play Full of Surprises,” *Explorer* (August 2012), available at <http://www.aapg.org/Publications/News/Explorer/Emphasis/ArticleID/1984/Mancos-Niobrara-Play-Full-of-Surprises>.

⁹⁸ *Id.* (analyst noting well production results “very encouraging” but also noting that hard to tell whether production is economic because company hadn’t disclosed cost of well; long-term gas prices will be determinative if it’s dry gas (without marketable liquids like propane)); *see also* Colson, John. “WPX Energy calls it ‘The Beast,’ and more are on the way” (Sept. 13, 2013), available at <http://www.postindependent.com/news/8122256-113/beast-wells-formation-wpx> (describing “prodigious” output of WPX’s horizontal well and its plans to drill 14 more in the Niobrara formation in 2014).

⁹⁹ Webb 2013.

flows before 1978 (Ray et al. 2008). Although there are both natural and human influences on these hydrologic trends, studies indicate that anthropogenic greenhouse gases began to impact snow-fed streamflow timing during 1950-1999 (Barnett et al. 2008, Hidalgo et al. 2009, Hoerling et al. 2013). Modeling studies have projected that snowmelt, spring runoff, and streamflow timing will continue to shift earlier across much of the Southwest (Stewart et al. 2004, Rauscher et al. 2008, Dettinger et al. 2015).

3. Decreasing snowpack

The Colorado River receives most of its water from winter snowpack from the Rocky Mountains, where 15% of the total basin areas generates 85% of the river flow (Dettinger et al. 2015). Across much of the Colorado River basin, the spring snowpack is decreasing and more winter precipitation is falling as rain instead of snow (Hamlet et al. 2005, Pierce et al. 2008, Das et al. 2009). Approximately half of the observed decline in snowpack in the western United States during 1950-1999 has been attributed to the effects of anthropogenic greenhouse gases, ozone and aerosols (Pierce et al. 2008). Modeling studies project a continued reduction of Southwest mountain snowpack during February through May during this century, largely due to the effects of rising temperatures (Cayan et al. 2013, Dettinger et al. 2015).

4. Declining Runoff and Streamflow

Annual runoff in the Colorado River basin appears to be declining (USBR 2011), with significant consequences for reduced streamflow. During 2001–2010, warm temperatures and dry conditions reduced average naturalized flows in the Colorado River (measured at Lees Ferry) to the second-lowest-flow decade since 1901, to 12.6 million acre-feet per year compared to the 1901–2000 average of 15.0 million acre-feet per year (Hoerling et al. 2013).

Modeling studies project that runoff and streamflow will continue to decrease substantially in the Colorado River basin during this century (Ray et al. 2008, Das et al. 2011, USBR 2011, Cayan et al. 2013, Georgakakos et al. 2014, Dettinger et al. 2015). Barnett and Pierce (2009) concluded that anthropogenic climate change is likely to reduce runoff in the Colorado River basin by 10-30% by 2050. Projected reductions in runoff range from 6-7% (Christensen and Lettenmaier 2007) to 45% (Hoerling and Eischeid 2007) depending on the models and methods used in each study (see Barnett and Pierce 2009 at Table 2). In the short term, Hoerling and Eischeid (2007) predict streamflow to decrease by 25% during 2006-2030, and by 45% during 2035-2060.

Importantly, numerous studies show that warming temperatures alone will cause runoff and streamflow declines in the Colorado River basin. For example, in a recent review, Vano et al. (2014) estimated that future streamflow in the Colorado River basin will be reduced by 5% to 35% due to rising temperature alone. When precipitation change is considered, a 5% decrease in precipitation would further reduce streamflow by 10% to 15% (Vano et al. 2014).

Moreover, warming temperatures will play an increasingly important role in causing runoff to decline in the Colorado River basin, and must be factored into streamflow forecasts (Woodhouse et al. 2016). An empirical study of the influence of precipitation, temperature, and soil moisture on upper Colorado River basin streamflow over the past century found that warmer

temperatures have already resulted in flows less than expected based on precipitation levels (Woodhouse et al. 2016). The study was “the first to examine the instrumental historical record to see if a temperature effect could be detected.”¹⁰⁰ Consistent with past research, the study found that cool season precipitation explains most of the variability in annual streamflow. However, temperature was highly influential in determining streamflow under certain conditions. The study concluded that “[s]ince 1988, a marked increase in the frequency of warm years with lower flows than expected, given precipitation, suggests continued warming temperatures will be an increasingly important influence in reducing future UCRB water supplies.” The researchers warned that “streamflow forecasts run the risk of overprediction if warming spring and early summer temperatures are not adequately considered.”

5. Increasing Drought Severity

Historically, droughts in the Colorado River basin were primarily driven by precipitation deficits. However, studies indicate that rising temperatures have begun to play a more important role in driving droughts (Hoerling et al. 2013, Vano et al. 2014). Importantly, rising temperature superimposed on natural drought variability is expected to exacerbate the impacts of droughts (Seager et al. 2012, Cook et al. 2015). Modeling studies project that droughts in the Southwest will intensify due to longer periods of dry weather and more extreme heat, leading to higher evapotranspiration and moisture loss (Seager et al. 2007, Cayan et al. 2010, Trenberth et al. 2013). In the Colorado River basin, future droughts are projected to be substantially hotter, and drought is projected to become more frequent, intense, and longer lasting than in the historical record (Garfin et al. 2014).

6. Reduced reservoir levels and unsustainable demand for water

Of the more than 90 reservoirs on the river and its tributaries, the two largest are Lake Mead and Lake Powell which together can store up to 85% of the total flow for the basin combined (Christensen et al. 2004). Reservoirs in the Colorado River basin are highly vulnerable to climate change, particularly because the amount of storage in reservoirs is sensitive to runoff changes (Barnett and Pierce 2008). Even small decreases in runoff have caused average reservoir levels to markedly decrease (Christensen et al. 2004). Christensen et al. (2004) predicted that climate change impacts on the hydrology of the Colorado River system would result in water demand (deliveries and evaporation) exceeding reservoir inflows (which would also be decreased), resulting in a degraded system. Likewise, Barnett and Pierce (2008) projected that a 10% reduction in runoff would result in requested water deliveries surpassing sustainable deliveries by 2040, while a 20% reduction in runoff would cause unsustainable water demands by 2025. A greater demand than supply makes the system more prone to long-term sustained droughts, as reservoirs will not have sufficient time to be naturally replenished and more water will be extracted from a dwindling supply than is sustainable (Christensen and Lettenmaier 2007). Reservoirs would spend additional time in a depleted state, weakening the system’s buffering ability in years where there is low precipitation (Barnett and Pierce 2009).

¹⁰⁰ Colorado River flows reduced by warmer spring temperatures, Science Daily (March 9, 2016), available at <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/03/160309125412.htm>

In sum, the best available scientific data indicates that climate change is resulting in higher temperatures in the Colorado River Basin, reduced snowpack, reduced runoff, and increased drought, *which have already reduced* and will continue to reduce stream flows in the Basin. BLM must reinitiate consultation on the PBO to take into account these climate change effects on the upper Colorado River Basin and on the endangered fish. The omission of climate change effects on the upper Colorado River Basin is especially stark, given that the programmatic biological opinion for fluid mineral depletions in the San Juan River Basin addresses climate change effects such as higher temperatures and earlier runoff within the Basin.¹⁰¹

However, despite that certain climate change effects were addressed in the SJRB PBO, climate change effects on stream flows in the San Juan River Basin are not adequately addressed in the programmatic biological opinion, in light of the recent studies discussed above. BLM and the Service must reinitiate consultation on the SJRB PBO as well and evaluate how climate-change induced stream flow reductions will affect the survival of the endangered fish in the San Juan River Basin.

V. BLM Should Not Be Leasing Parcels in Roadless Areas.

Parcels COC77676, COC77678, COC77679, COC77680, and COC77681 are within areas designated as Roadless areas pursuant to the 2011 Colorado Roadless Rule. Leasing these parcels, even with protective stipulations, will impact the character, ecological benefits, and functionality of these Roadless areas.

a. Leasing these Roadless parcels is in violation of NEPA.

Inadequate NEPA analysis has been conducted to support the leasing of these Roadless parcels. The Tres Rios Field Office and San Juan National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan Final EIS, provides that “[o]nce the USFS determines what lands are available for leasing and the BLM has adopted the analysis, the BLM may offer the selected NFS lands for lease consistent with those decisions. FEIS at 480. BLM then deems it appropriate that any further analysis of the site specific impacts of leasing parcels on its land should be withheld until after the parcels are already leased. FEIS at 482. Deferring NEPA analysis until resources have been committed (i.e. leasing the parcels) is arbitrary and capricious. Once boundaries are delineated, site specific impacts can be determined. Deferring to the general analysis contained in RMP EIS is insufficient to capture all the impacts of leasing, including those mentioned throughout this protest. Further, the circumstances which result in cumulative impacts have changed since the prior analysis. Forest fires, subsequent actions, bark beetle infestation, water uses, and a host of other impacts and decisions have changed the baseline for NEPA analysis. Failing to revisit and revise any analysis that has been conducted results in a decision based on stale analysis. We urge the BLM to withdraw these parcels from this lease sale to determine the true impacts of leasing which will most likely result in a decision not to lease. Anything aside

¹⁰¹ Fish and Wildlife Service Programmatic Biological Opinion for Water Depletions Associated with BLM’s Fluid Mineral Program and Other Actions Authorized by BLM on Public Lands within the San Juan River Basin in Colorado (Nov. 21, 2008).

from this course of action is a violation of Federal law and subjects the agency to further challenges.

VI. Negative Impacts to Columbian Sharp-Tailed Grouse.

Parcels COC77676 and COC77677 fall within Columbian sharp-tailed grouse lek sites (4 mile buffer) and winter range. These parcels should be deferred based on the potential impacts on this sensitive species. This grouse is listed as locally imperiled in Colorado and occupies less than 10% of former range. The species is threatened by habitat loss/degradation.¹⁰² Further, the only stipulation attached to these parcels limits the timing of operations based on winter range. There are no stipulations attached to ensure these lek sites are not disrupted by drilling, infrastructure development, road construction, or any of the other disruptive activities associated with oil and gas exploration and development. *See* Center EA Comment at 45. Based on the imperiled status of this species it is arbitrary and capricious to offer these parcels for lease sale.

Conclusion

Unconventional oil and gas development not only fuel the climate crisis but entail significant public health risks and harms to the environment. Accordingly, BLM should end all new leasing on BLM lands. Should BLM proceed with the lease sale it must thoroughly analyze the alternatives of no new leasing (or no action), and no fracking or other unconventional well stimulation methods in an EIS. Thank you for your consideration of these comments. We look forward to reviewing a legally adequate EIS for this proposed oil and gas leasing action.

Sincerely,

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¹⁰²http://explorer.natureserve.org/servlet/NatureServe?sourceTemplate=tabular_report.wmt&loadTemplate=species_RptComprehensive.wmt&selectedReport=RptComprehensive.wmt&summaryView=tabular_report.wmt&elKey=104539&paging=home&save=true&startIndex=1&nextStartIndex=1&reset=false&offPageSelectedElKey=104539&offPageSelectedElType=species&offPageYesNo=true&post_processes=&radiobutton=radiobutton&selectedIndexes=104539

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